CoP-9 in Milan: A
Fashionable Trend for Climate Agreements
By Agus P. Sari
 What will we see at the ninth conference of parties (CoP-9) to the
UN climate change convention? Three things come to my mind. First, and the most
anticipated one, is the set of rules for land use, land-use change, and forestry (LULUCF)
projects in the clean development mechanism (CDM); second, adaptation to climate impacts;
third, whether and when Russia will ratify — determining entry into force of the
Kyoto Protocol; and fourth, a possible start of a discussion on the future of the
international regime on climate change after 2012.
LULUCF: Agreement on rules for LULUCF in CDM is the most anticipated outcome at
CoP-9. I am agnostic about the inclusion of LULUCF in CDM, unless its scientific soundness
is ensured, the benefits and pitfalls already demonstrated by science are addressed, and
it contributes to local and national sustainability.
The inclusion of LULUCF is both already agreed upon (thus
it will be "in" whether we like it or not) but limited (to 1 per cent of
1990 emissions of Annex I countries). While the technical issues such as that of leakage
and permanence need to be resolved, so are the issues of sustainable development, i.e.,
whether forestry CDM will actually help or jeopardize local sustainability (biodiversity,
water cycle, tenurial rights, and indigenous cultures), a classic problem with almost all
forestry projects.
Imposition of international rules on sovereign states may backfire, especially in case of
developing countries most of which gained independence less than half a century ago and
are still strongly anti-foreign interference. But at least on paper the rules need to be
good, otherwise there will be nothing to hold on to. In this regard, a checklist such as
in the draft text for negotiation can provide a bare-minimum rule.
Additionally, to assist potential investors to differentiate good projects from bad ones,
a quality standard may help. Learning from the potential positive impacts (such as the
"gold standard" for the energy projects) this quality standard can offer, some
forestry-friendly institutions began to develop a quality standard for forestry projects
—CDM and non-CDM. Of course, for anti-sink, this is admittedly making "bad"
projects look good. To my judgment, this is better than letting potential investors be in
the dark and in turn promote potentially destructive forestry projects.
But CDM is over-hyped in the first place, and there is already too much ado about its
nothingness. From what has been announced by Annex I countries as of today, CDM will only
deliver about US $600 million in the current market demand — falling short of the
billions of dollars anticipated previously. A model that my institute, Pelangi, developed
shows that CDM could cover about 40 per cent of the emission reduction efforts, but only
when the US was on board. This constitutes about 6 billion tonnes of carbon only. Without
the US, the demand could go down to as little as zero.
Adaptation: CoP-8 in New Delhi, India, last year put into prominence adaptation
issue. But, much attention is still being devoted to the physical and the socio-economic
impacts. In the debate on adaptation to these impacts, strong interests lie in the
physical and technical measures, and the cost. Discussion on the Adaptation Fund —
its amount and predictability — comes in the forefront. It is also unfortunate that
oil-exporting countries have been hijacking the issue with impacts of response measures
(compensating oil-exporting economies for losses due to reduced demand resulting from
emissions limitation). There is no adequate and predictable stream of funding to address
adaptation needs.
While even US $1 billion will not be enough, I argue that we need to know how we can spend
the money, if at all available, efficiently and reach the right targets. No single Article
within United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and its Kyoto
Protocol deals comprehensively with adaptation.
The National Action Plan for Adaptation (NAPA) may be helpful for the least developed
countries. But so far, existing response strategies have been either formulated at the
international or internationally-driven national levels. This way, the approach tends to
be state-oriented with limited inputs and involvement from the civil society and, most
importantly, from the potential victims. This poses some problems. Traditional management
of internationally-driven projects will bring conditionalities, for example, to employ
"international consultants" from the donor countries. This can easily absorb
half of the budget. Second, in countries laden with problems of corruption and lack of
accountability, there are limitations in terms of the capacity, the ability to reach the
right targets, and the effectiveness of the use of resources (and funds). In the end, only
a fraction — a quarter, if we are lucky — of this "adaptation fund"
will go to developing country parties and even less than that will be used directly to
increase their resilience to climate change.
Russian Ratification: As I started writing this article, CNN reported that Russian
President Putin said that Russia "is still undecided" about ratifying the Kyoto
Protocol, even joked that global warming might benefit his country by lessening the need
for fur coats. This indeed is not a good sign. Responsible for 17 per cent of Annex I
emissions, Russia now holds the trump card for achieving the 55 per cent of emissions
ratifications from Annex I stipulation for the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol.
Without the US and Russia, Annex I ratifications will only represent 47 per cent of their
emissions, and this is insufficient for entry into force. With Russia, it will be 64 per
cent.
But Russia has its own domestic politics. Even after large hot air – valued at some
billions of dollars – and large discounts on their stabilisation commitments through
the use of domestic sinks and others, it is still not ratifying for economic and other
reasons very similar to the US. While some skeptical scientists in Russia try to undermine
the credibility of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (shown in the Russian
Workshop recently), some bureaucrats cry that the Protocol is bad for Russian economic
recovery, as was demonstrated by the internal disputes within the Ministry of Economic
Development and Trade.
But these anti-Kyoto voices are not new. As a Canadian representative stated at the recent
Moscow meeting, Canada and Russia have a lot in common with regards to climate change. And
if climate change will bring damaging impacts to Canada, it will to Russia, too. Surely
enough, with its capacity to say "no" to the Iraq war, Russia should be able to
refuse joining the bandwagon of the largest climate terrorist of the world.
After 2012 Climate Regime: Why start talking about the international regime on
climate change after 2012 when even the entry into force of the current Kyoto Protocol
— covering a commitment period up to 2012 — is at stake? Many will skeptically
ask this question, I believe. True. But not entirely. First, to limit the damage to an
acceptable level, much more emission reductions will be needed with or without Kyoto
Protocol. And industrialised countries alone may not be able to do so. Eventually,
developing countries will have to kick in. The question is how and when.
Even more importantly, developing countries can be proactive and develop their own
proposal tabled in the right time to instigate the most acceptable "process".
Rebuilding the climate of trust is imperative, especially after it has been badly broken
by the unilateral withdrawal of the US, when in best faith the world had agreed to craft
an agreement accommodating its needs. A group of "honest brokers", one that can
comprise of industrialised and developing countries that have not been strong negotiators
but whom all other Parties trust can be helpful. Moreover, it may be beneficial if the
process could start from outside the negotiations, rather than from a negotiating session.
Developing countries should be able to gather themselves outside the negotiating sessions
to develop their capacity, knowledge of implications, and individual and collective
negotiating positions.
Lastly, CoP-9 will be a large marketplace for buyers and sellers of emission credits.
Confidence in the market is clearly increasing, even with Russia’s zigzagging. Bring
your Project Identification Note. Bring your bags of money to buy those cheap credits
— to sell them later at higher prices. Bring your lawyers. And a nice pen to sign it.
So, welcome to the jungle of CoP-9. The right-wing government of Italy may welcome you
with nice food, pretty faces, and luxury nothings in the fashion city of Milan. But the
battle is still uphill for you and me and the climate.
Agus P. Sari is Executive Director of Pelangi, an environmental research institute based
in Jakarta, Indonesia. He has been an advisor to the Indonesian delegation to climate
change negotiations
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