March 1995 - First Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP-1) - Berlin. Negotiators decide to start ‘activities implemented jointly’ (AIJ), which would be a pilot phase of the us proposal of ‘joint implementation.’ Projects under AIJ would have to be: 1) additional to what would otherwise occur; 2) voluntary - credits gained from the pilot phase with ‘aij’ between annex 1 and non-annex 1 parties would not be seen as the fulfilment of the concurrent commitments of Annex 1 parties under Art. 4.2(b) of the unfccc – to return individually or jointly to 1990 levels. cop-1 decided to have a comprehensive review of the pilot phase no later than the year 2000.

May 1997 - Brazilian proposal for a ‘Clean Development Fund’(CDF) released. Was based upon the principle of penalizing the non-complying Annex-1 countries and using a percentage of this financial penalty to compensate the non-Annex 1 countries who were mostly vulnerable to the vagaries of global climate change. It had a number of similarities to the present day CDM ; but the biggest difference was that the CDF concept includes financial penalties to Annex 1 parties for non-compliance. Annex 1 parties did not accept such a concept.

June 1997 - the US senate adopt the so-called Byrd-Hagel resolution. This stated that the Kyoto Protocol, or any subsequent international climate change agreement, should not "(a) mandate new commitments to limit or reduce ghg emissions for the Annex 1 Parties, unless the Protocol also mandates new specific scheduled commitments to limit or reduce ghg emissions for developing country Parties within the same compliance period, or (b) would result in serious harm to the economy of the US . . . " Under such domestic conditions, the only and ultimate instruments the Clinton/Gore administration could rely on – in order to agree on some quantified target – were the inclusion of market-based instruments such as emissions trading and joint implementation. This would mean they would be strong proponents of the idea during Kyoto.

December 1997 – COP3 - Kyoto, Japan – delegates agree to a Protocol to the UNFCCC (the Kyoto Protocol). This commits Annex 1 countries to achieve quantified emissions reduction targets, an average of 5.2% below 1990 levels between 2008-2012. The Protocol covers 6 greenhouse gases: Carbon dioxide (co₂), Methane (ch4), Nitrous Oxide (n2o), Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCS), Perfluorocarbons (PCFS), and Sulphur hexafluoride (SF6). Three flexible mechanisms are included in the Protocol to assist in these reductions: an Emissions Trading System; Joint Implementation; and the CDM(which was included in the last minute through the final night, as the ‘Kyoto surprise’). CDM filled the gap between Annex 1 and non-Annex 1 parties (the US’ joint implementation, and the Brazilian CDF). The intrinsic nature of the mechanism is a win-win solution – fostered from the original concept in the convention –to help Annex 1 countries to reduce their emissions while at the same time promote sustainable development in the non-Annex 1 country. The innovative interpretation allows the Brazilian CDF concept to be transformed into a mechanism promoting market-based investment, instead of penalizing the Annex 1 parties financially.

The Protocol would only come into force if it has been ratified by 55 parties to the unfccc, including industrialised countries responsible for at least 55 percent of the emissions of the industrialised countries in 1990.

June 1998 – Bonn, Germany – The subsidiary body for implementation (SBI) and the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technical Advice (SBSTA) – met to lay the ground for COP-4 scheduled for November. By now, 39 parties had signed the Kyoto protocol, those emitting 39 percent of all industrialised countries’ emissions. The CDM agenda here was to rush through the rules and guidelines so that "real trading" could begin. When Australia mentioned, "scientific evidence indicates that actions by Annex 1 countries alone would be insufficient," the US added that this was clearly due to the small number of parties involved. Responding to this, G-77 and China said that the second review by COP-4 must respect the unfccc mandate, and not be distracted by superfluous considerations of "new" commitments for developing countries.

What is interesting was the complete divorce of this political review process from the science of global change. The first review of the Kyoto Protocol was expected at best around 2004-2005, too late to link science with politics.

November 1998 – COP4 - Buenos Aires, Argentina – Buenos Aires Plan of Action. US-led developed countries try to ensure that ceilings on non-domestic emission curbs do not materialise. Buenos Aires Plan of Action includes deadlines on a number of issues: Financial mechanisms - which will assist the developing world to respond to the challenges related to climate change; Development and transfer of technologies; Rules governing the Kyoto Mechanisms with priority given to the Clean Development Mechanism.

November 2000 – COP6- The Hague, Netherlands – Talks fail miserably. The negotiations with G-77 and China are deadlocked mainly over the issues of finance and technology transfer. US negotiators use trick and treat tactics to break down opposition of developing countries to CDM (promoting it as a synonym for overseas investment). Some southern negotiators are still picking holes in the various rules and definitions of CDM , while most parties wanted the trading mechanism to begin as fast as possible. What compromises will have to be made? The G-77 and China will also want the us to participate – but for another reason. Without the US, the largest buyer of emission credits, the trade under CDM is also expected to shrink.

June 2001 – Pronk proposals – Jan Pronk, Dutch Environment Minister. Releases proposals for COP-7 to try to get Japan on board, mainly with the inclusion and broadening of carbon ‘sinks’ under the protocol, which would allow Annex-1 an easy way of meeting their emissions targets. He also gives another sop to industrialised countries – by allowing them to accumulate surplus cers to meet reduction obligations in the second commitment period. This provision means industrialised countries can now buy emission reductions credits at throwaway prices from developing countries and bank them for future use. But developing countries, having sold cheap ways of reducing emissions, will be forced to take recourse to expensive methods when it is their turn to reduce in the future. The bottom line is that the many compromises will make the Kyoto protocol not even worth the paper it is written on. The Kyoto protocol is a grand fudge account where every polluter is working overtime to make sure that it is business as usual, if not better. In all this, the role of the G-77 sand China has been pathetic. They have shown little political sagacity in the negotiations. Instead, each COP sees this largest grouping of countries squabbling over funds and technology transfer – discussions in which they have never won anything, except for empty promises. This group of most vulnerable countries was ineffective at articulating its position.

July 2001 - COP-6 resumes - Bonn Germany- Environmentalists angry at the loophole on LULUCF (land-use, land-use change and forestry) put up placards on small bushes and potted plants in the conference centre saying, "do not touch. This is an Australian sink."

US withdrawal has driven negotiations under the UNFCCC to a feverish pitch. The world now has two options – convolute the climate treaty to meet US demands (including the one that countries like China and India take on legally binding commitments), or go without the US, the world’s largest polluter.

EU at last decides to part ways with the US. Swedish prime minister and host Goeran Persson said that the EU would stick with the Kyoto treaty. "Kyoto is not meaningless without the US," defended Persson, "because it is the first step." All these countries want concessions in the use of sinks – using forests, grazing lands and croplands to sequester carbon dioxide to meet their commitments. Sinks have, therefore, become the battle ground to make or break the Kyoto pact. And each one of these countries is working hard to get the maximum concessions possible in this great bargain. Japan is key – Russia and Ukraine and the EU account for about 53 percent. It is the last two percent that is difficult.

October/November 2001 – COP-7 – The Marrakesh Accords: 170 countries agree on rules to implement the 1997 Kyoto protocol, but agreement has no teeth. The Accords set out building blocks for decisions under the Protocol and UNFCCC, including the flexibility mechanisms(CDM, Joint implementation and Emissions trading), and tries to build over the political agreement reached at Bonn in July. This marks the beginning of a new phase of action and implementation, if a little diluted. This should pave the way for the ratification of the protocol before the end of 2002, a self-imposed deadline to ensure that nations have necessary policies and legislations in place to reduce emissions when the first five-year commitment period commences in 2008. Welcome decision was that industrialised countries would not be allowed to bank carbon dioxide credits generated through sinks’ activities to meet commitment periods.

The CDM takes on a new form. It now appears that a developing country can unilaterally start a project and sell credits to industrialised countries.

4 June 2002 - Japan ratifies the Kyoto Protocol – But with Japan on board, the agreement still only has support from countries responsible for 36% of gases. The US alone was worth 36.1% of ghg emissions in 1990. Kyoto, and CDM, are now a significant step closer to fruition - Two months earlier was the 10^th anniversary of the UNFCCC.

October/November 2002 – COP-8 (New Delhi, India) Delhi Declarations. Informal discussions continue on developing countries future commitments. Discussions are once again postponed on a review of how adequately industrialised countries are dealing with climate change. CDM Executive Board set up at COP-7 presented its report to the conference, and formed the basis of discussions. An important outcome of COP–8 was to make the Kyoto Protocol’s CDM fully operational. The decision also adopted the simplified modalities and procedures for small-scale CDM project activities, which should mean that more apply, and paved the way for possible early approval of CDM activities.

December 2003 – COP-9 (Milan, Italy) – Parties agree on rules and procedures for the CDM Executive Board, and modalities and procedures for afforestation and reforestation (A&R) activities under the CDM. The COP decides that a CDM project activity starting between the date of adoption of decision on modalities and procedures for the CDM and the date of the first registration of a CDM project activity may use a crediting period starting before the date of its registration if the project activity is submitted for registration before 31 December 2005. This means that projects that have already begun may now apply as CDM projects.

June 2004 – Twentieth Session of the Subsidiary Bodies to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change – Parties unable to resolve issues of bundling (clustering of small projects to decrease transaction costs), leakage (unintended consequences of activities leading to increasing emissions in an area outside the project boundary), definitions of low-income communities and monitoring.

The parties encourage the EB to continue to assess existing and new ways to ensure transparency; and recalls that the use of the ‘tool for the demonstration and assessment of additionality is not mandatory for project participants.

They also request the SBSTA, in collaboration with the EB, to develop a recommendation to cop/mop-1 relating to the implications of the implementation of CDM project activities for the achievement of the objectives of other environmental conventions and protocols, in particular the Montreal Protocol.

October 22 2004– Russia ratifies the Protocol. The Kyoto protocol can now be enforced and CDM is underway. Without the US and Russia, Annex 1 ratifications would only represent 47 percent of their emissions, and this is insurricient for entry into force. With Russia, it is now 64 percent.

27 October 2004 - EU linking directive with JI/CDM – This allows the conversion of CER's into European Union Allowances (EUAS) thereby making companies in the EU a whole new set of buyers for CER's. Previously, European companies would not have used CER's. ERU's from JI are allowed into the EU as of 2008 which means competition for CDM projects.

December 2004 – COP-10 (Buenos Aires, Argentina) –Parties gathered to complete the unfinished business from the Marrakesh accords. Nicknamed ‘the adaptation COP’. Adaptation - what we going to do once global warming happens – are the main focus of discussions. The fact that the COP is focused on what will happen when the Protocol that the Conference of the Parties rests on, does not work, does not bear well for CDM.

Feb 16 2005 – Kyoto protocol enters into force. The Executive Board can now start registering projects.